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Abstract 
There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently 
existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that 
presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not 
incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that 
utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, 
and point out a flaw in Gödel’s modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an 
interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.  
                                                                 
1I have given talks based on previous versions of this paper at Princeton University, the 
American University of Beirut, California Polytechnic State University, and the University of 
Kentucky. I thank the audiences at these presentations for helpful discussion. I also thank 
Gordon Belot, Mauro Dorato, Brian Kierland, Steven Savitt, Bas van Fraassen, Steve Weinstein, 
and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
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1. Introduction.  I am a presentist: I believe that only presently existing things exist.2 Contrast 
presentism with eternalism: the eternalist believes that past, present, and future things all exist. 
Assuming that there are three spatial dimensions, the eternalist believes that the universe is four-
dimensional, and while there are different events in different regions of this so-called “block 
universe”, the universe as a whole does not change. The presentist, in contrast, believes that the 
universe is three-dimensional. 
 I am also a Heraclitean: I believe that change is a fundamental aspect of reality. Contrast 
Heracliteanism with Parmenideanism: the Parmenidean believes that fundamentally, there is no 
change. It is possible to be a Parmenidean presentist, where the universe simply consists of three 
dimensions of space, and the state of the things in that space does not change with time. (Julian 
Barbour (1999), for example, can be construed as holding this position.) From now on, by 
“presentism” I mean Heraclitean presentism.  
 The point of this paper is not to argue for presentism, but to defend presentism from a 
particular type of argument that is often taken to refute it.3 The form of the argument is as 
follows: 
(1) Presentism is incompatible with relativity theory (usually the focus is on special relativity). 
                                                                 
2At least, I am a presentist on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays – those are the days I am 
writing this paper.  
3Nor is a point of this paper to make clear the difference between presentism and eternalism. 
Some philosophers (such as Callender 2000, S588) claim not to see the difference, and there is 
nothing I can briefly say (beyond what I said above) to convince them otherwise.  
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(2) Relativity theory is our most fundamental theory of physics.4 
(3) Presentism is incompatible with our most fundamental physics. (From (1) and (2).) 
(4) Presentism is false. (From (3).) 
 W.V.O. Quine provides a good example of this argumentative tradition: 
 
Just as forward and backward are distinguishable only relative to an orientation, so, 
according to Einstein’s relativity principle, space and time are distinguishable only 
relative to a velocity. This discovery leaves no reasonable alternative to treating time as 
spacelike.  (Quine 1960, 36) 
 
If we have discovered that time is spacelike, then we have discovered that presentism is false, 
since, just as we do not ontologically privilege events here in space as the only events that exist, 
so we cannot privilege events now in time as the only events that exist.  
 Perhaps the most famous version of the argument sketched above is given by Hilary 
Putnam. Relying on special relativity, Putnam gives an argument with the following conclusion: 
                                                                 
4For those who believe there is no such thing as “our most fundamental theory”, (2) can be 
replaced with  
 (2*) There is no theory of physics more fundamental than relativity theory, 
and similarly (3) can be replaced with 
(3*) Presentism is incompatible with a theory of physics T which is maximally 
fundamental; that is, no theory more fundamental than T exists. 
This supposes that, while one theory can sometimes be declared more fundamental than another, 
there is no one most fundamental theory (following for example Belot 2000). Most people who 
reject the idea that one theory can be more fundamental than another will also reject any version 
of the move from (3) to (4), and hence are already convinced that the argument in question 
against presentism is a bad one.  
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the problem of the reality and the determinateness of future events is now solved. 
Moreover, it is solved by physics and not by philosophy. We have learned that we live in 
a four-dimensional and not a three-dimensional world...  (Putnam 1967, 247) 
 
If we live in a four-dimensional world, presentism is false.  
 The reader will no doubt recognize that the move from (3) to (4) is non-trivial; whether 
one sanctions it depends on to what extent one believes that our best scientific theories give 
truths about the nature of reality. Debates about this issue have been going on for quite a while 
now, and the proponents of the various positions are rather entrenched; it would be preferable if 
the presentist could reject the argument without having to reject scientific realism. My approach 
to rejecting the argument starts with the relatively uncontroversial claim that (2) is false: general 
relativity is incompatible with quantum mechanics, so our most fundamental physics can be 
found in the nascent theories of quantum gravity which attempt to resolve the incompatibility. It 
turns out that there are some theories of quantum gravity which are compatible with presentism. 
Thus, (3) is false, and presentism is unrefuted.  
 
2. Fixed Foliation Quantum Gravity.  There are currently two main approaches to developing a 
theory of quantum gravity: the particle physics approach, leading to string theory and M theory, 
and the general relativity approach, leading to canonical quantum gravity and loop quantum 
gravity. (For a review of the various approaches see for example Rovelli 1998.) Canonical 
quantum gravity faces the much-discussed problem of time: on the standard way of quantizing 
general relativity, the fundamental dynamical equation does not include a time parameter. (See 
for example Isham 1993 and Kuchar 1999.) One proposed solution to the problem of time is first 
to specify a foliation: that is, a particular way of dividing up spacetime into spacelike 
hypersurfaces. In the most-discussed version of this solution, the spacetime is foliated into CMC 
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hypersurfaces – that is, hypersurfaces of constant mean (extrinsic) curvature (Beig 1994; Fischer 
and Moncrief 1997). Then, the theory is quantized, resulting in a fundamental dynamical 
equation that can describe the evolution of a system over time.  
 This CMC theory of canonical quantum gravity is not the only version of fixed foliation 
quantum gravity: within canonical quantum gravity, there are other ways of fixing the foliation 
besides relying on constant mean curvature; a version of Bohmian quantum gravity has a fixed 
foliation (Goldstein and Teufel 2001, 284); and there are more radical approaches as well (such 
as the general ether theory of Schmelzer 2001). 
 Fixed foliation quantum gravity is compatible with presentism. To show this, it will be 
helpful to utilize the semantic view of scientific theories (see for example van Fraassen 1987). A 
scientific theory is taken to have two parts, the theoretical structure and the theoretical 
hypotheses. The theoretical structure consists of a family of mathematical models. For standard 
spacetime theories, each model of the theory can be taken to consist (at least in part) of an 
ordered set, whose members are a four-dimensional manifold and various geometric objects 
giving the spacetime structure of the manifold. The theoretical hypotheses are propositions 
expressing how the mathematical models should be taken to represent the world, according to the 
theory. (See for example Giere 1988, 80.) 
 The theories of fixed foliation quantum gravity are spacetime theories, in that the 
theoretical structure of the theory is such that the models of the theory are four-dimensional 
spacetime models. This does not mean that fixed foliation quantum gravity entails eternalism, 
though. To see what the theories say about the world, one must look to their theoretical 
hypotheses. One could have an eternalist theoretical hypothesis which specifies that the events in 
the spacetime model all represent existing events, so that past, present, and future events all 
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exist. One could, however, have a presentist theoretical hypothesis which specifies that a 
particular spacelike hypersurface in the foliation represents the set of existing events, and that the 
set of existing events changes with time.  
 In practice the physicists who put forth theories of fixed foliation quantum gravity do not 
specify what metaphysics of time their theory entails. This means that the theory simply leaves 
open that metaphysical issue; the openness can only be resolved with an interpretation.5 The 
reason theories of fixed foliation quantum gravity are compatible with presentism, then, is that 
they can be interpreted in such a way that they entail presentism.   
 
3. Presentism and Relativity Theory.  It is worth making explicit why I give the defense of 
presentism at the level of quantum gravity. If presentism were compatible with special and 
general relativity, but incompatible with quantum gravity, (3) would nevertheless be true. 
Because of this, the compatibility of presentism with special and general relativity is prima facie 
irrelevant to the issue of the truth of presentism.  
 Nevertheless, much has been written on the issue of the compatibility of presentism with 
special and general relativity. The general sentiment amongst philosophers, which I share, is that 
presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity. (This general sentiment is 
expressed by for example Savitt 2000, Callender 2000, and Saunders 1996, 2000; for dissensions 
see Hinchliff 2000 and Craig 2000, 2001.) The reason for the general sentiment is that the 
                                                                 
5For simplicity I an speaking as if there is a definite line between theory and interpretation, but in 
fact I agree with van Fraassen’s point:  
The division between the theory proper and the interpretative elements already 
introduced by its main or earliest proponents is of course to some extent arbitrary. ... it 
would be unrealistic not to see the official theory as to some extent indefinite. (van 
Fraassen 1994, 7) 
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models of special relativity have spacetimes of the form <M, ?>, and the models of general 
relativity have spacetimes of the form <M, g>, where M is a four-dimensional manifold, ? a 
Minkowski metric, and g a generalization of the Minkowski metric; these spacetimes do not have 
a foliation into spacelike hypersurfaces as part of their structure. Granted, such a foliation can 
sometimes be added to the spacetime: for some models of general relativity, for example, the 
spacetime structure itself allows one to pick out a foliation, such as the constant mean curvature 
foliation mentioned above (see Isenberg 1995 for details).6 But the point is that the foliation is 
not a part of the spacetime structure as given, and thus imposing such a foliation amounts to 
changing the theory.  
 That is simply a brief explanation of the general sentiment that presentism is 
incompatible with special and general relativity. Supposing the sentiment is correct, what 
relevance does that have for the truth of presentism?  
 One possible answer is that, in the absence of a definite theory of quantum gravity, one 
would expect the results about the nature of time in relativity theory to carry over to quantum 
gravity. The problem with this answer is simply that there are various theories of quantum 
gravity, and in some of them – such as the theories of fixed foliation quantum gravity – this 
                                                                 
6John Norton (2000, 42) points out that locally (in “mini-spacetime”) all spacetimes of general 
relativity are Minkowskian and respect the relativity of simultaneity, but “Once we relate these 
mini-spacetimes to the larger spacetime, the richer structure of the larger spacetime may select a 
preferred simultaneity relation.” Moreover, this preferred simultaneity relation “can be projected 
into the mini-spacetime.” This puts in context Steven Savitt’s (2000, S572-3) point that “every 
general relativistic model (M, g) is required locally to have the structure of Minkowski 
spacetime.” 
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expectation is not borne out. 
 This reply leads to another possible answer: instead of just expecting the incompatibility 
of presentism with relativity theory to carry over to quantum gravity, one should require that it 
does so. This view is widely held (at least implicitly) by physicists working on quantum gravity. 
For example, Carlo Rovelli writes: 
special relativity teaches us something about time which many of us have difficulty 
accepting ... there is no physical meaning in the idea of ‘the state of the world right 
now’... (Rovelli 2001, 111) 
 
Addressing theories such as fixed foliation quantum gravity, Rovelli says: 
Many approaches to quantum gravity go out of their way to reinsert in the theory what 
[general relativity] teaches us to abandon: a preferred time. ... At the fundamental level 
we should, simply, forget time. (Rovelli 2001, 114) 
 
 In the course of a scientific revolution, scientists do not completely reject old theories and 
old ways of thinking. Copernicus, for example, attempted to hold on to Aristotelian physics 
while espousing his revolutionary heliocentric ideas. Similarly, it is not surprising that physicists 
draw certain lessons from relativity theory which they utilize in formulating theories of quantum 
gravity. Moreover, as has often been pointed out, one of the interesting aspects of the 
development of quantum gravity so far is that the theories are not being generated subject to the 
constraint of new experimental data. Physicist C. J. Isham points out the consequence: 
This lack of hard empirical data means that research in the subject has tended to focus on 
the construction of abstract theoretical schemes that are (i) internally consistent (in a 
mathematical sense), and (ii) are compatible with some preconceived set of concepts. 
(Isham 1994, 5) 
 
He also says: 
In practice, most research in quantum gravity has been based on various prima facie 
views about what the theory should look like – these being grounded partly on the 
philosophical prejudices of the researcher involved...  (Isham 1997, 169; cf. Butterfield 
and Isham 2001, 38) 
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While Isham does not explicitly give examples of preconceived sets of concepts or philosophical 
prejudices, presumably he has in mind ideas such as the ones presented above: there is no 
physical meaning in ‘the state of the world right now’; at the fundamental level we should forget 
time.  
 The lesson I draw from this is that, in spite of the fact that most physicists believe that 
relativity theory teaches us that a good theory is incompatible with presentism, there is no 
compelling reason for presentists to agree. Because of the lack of data to back up the claim that a 
good theory is incompatible with presentism, and because of the existence of potentially viable 
theories of fixed foliation quantum gravity, the presentist can simply maintain that most 
physicists are drawing the wrong lessons from relativity theory.   
 Moreover, there is historical precedent for physicists drawing a wrong lesson from a 
particular theory, with the mistake only realized once a more fundamental theory is thoroughly 
developed. For example, according to the traditional way of understanding electromagnetism, the 
vector potential is not real, while the electric and magnetic fields are. The advent of quantum 
mechanics, with its successful prediction of the Aharonov-Bohm effect, suggests that the vector 
potential is real as well.7 
 
                                                                 
7Belot (1998, 532) takes the approach that “until the discovery of the Aharonov-Bohm effect, we 
misunderstood what electromagnetism was telling us about our world.” Another approach, 
though, is to say that the Aharonov-Bohm effect shows another way in which electromagnetism 
is false. This should not be viewed as a deep philosophical issue: what the approaches disagree 
about is the referent of “electromagnetism”. (I grant, though, that which approach one takes may 
influence how one goes about developing more fundamental theories.) 
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4. Belot and Earman’s Objection.  I know of just two passages in the philosophy literature 
which are directly relevant to my defense of presentism on the basis of quantum gravity. Both 
passages can be construed as giving objections to my argument. I will consider Gordon Belot and 
John Earman’s objection in this section and Craig Callender’s in the next.  
 Belot and Earman (2001) base their discussion on the following passage from physicist 
Karel Kuchar: 
foliation fixing prevents one from asking what would happen if one attempted to measure 
the gravitational degrees of freedom on an arbitrary hypersurface. Such a solution ... 
amounts to conceding that one can quantize gravity only by giving up general relativity: 
to say that quantum gravity makes sense only when one fixes the foliation is essentially 
the same as saying that quantum gravity makes sense only in one coordinate system.  
(Kuchar 1992, 228) 
 
While Belot and Earman do not address Kuchar’s first criticism, it is worth replying to. Kuchar is 
presumably being metaphorical: there is no part of the theory which implies that one cannot ask 
what would happen if one attempted to perform a particular measurement. I take it that Kuchar is 
saying either that according to the theory the physical process of engaging in such a 
measurement is physically impossible, or that the theory makes no predictions for the outcome of 
such a measurement. If the former, then the theory makes an interesting empirically testable 
prediction about whether it is possible to perform such a measurement, and it would be best to 
test the prediction before drawing any conclusions about the theory. I think, though, that Kuchar 
is making the latter claim, that the theory is incomplete because it does not make predictions for 
certain physically possible measurements. But this latter claim is unjustified. One can use 
Newtonian physics, for example, to make a prediction for the measurement of the gravitational 
field on an arbitrary hypersurface, by using the theory to make predictions for the outcomes of 
measurements at various spacetime locations on the hypersurface. Kuchar has given no reason 
that one could not do the same in fixed foliation quantum gravity. 
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 Belot and Earman comment only on the last part of the Kuchar quote: 
This criticism is extremely telling. To forsake the conventional reading of general 
covariance as ruling out the existence of preferred co-ordinate systems is to abandon one 
of the central tenets of modern physics. Unsurprisingly, [fixed foliation quantum gravity] 
has few adherents... (Belot and Earman 2001, 241) 
 
Let me be clear: fixed foliation quantum gravity does not require a preferred coordinate system. 
Kuchar does not say that it does: he adds the qualification “essentially”, though he doesn’t 
explain what he means by this. Moreover, Belot and Earman I think agree with my claim that 
fixed foliation quantum gravity does not require a preferred coordinate system. At the beginning 
of their article, they say that philosophers  
have all learned that Kretschmann was quite correct to urge against Einstein that the 
‘General Theory of Relativity’ was no such thing, since any theory could be cast in a 
generally covariant form, and hence that the general covariance of general relativity 
could not have any physical content...  (Belot and Earman 2001, 213) 
 
What Belot and Earman go on to argue, though, is that the physical content of the general 
covariance of general relativity is that the theory ought to be formulated in a generally covariant 
fashion. While Belot and Earman consider different notions of general covariance, they never 
dispute the claim that any theory can be cast in a generally covariant form, when general 
covariance is understood as the criterion that there are no preferred coordinate systems. They 
point out, for example, that one can give a generally covariant formulation of Newtonian 
mechanics (2001, 214). Similarly, one can give a generally covariant formulation of fixed 
foliation quantum gravity; it follows that such a formulation would not have a preferred 
coordinate system.  
 The above discussion leads naturally to the following argument against fixed foliation 
quantum gravity: its most perspicuous formulation is not generally covariant, and this is a mark 
against it. This argument has been given by Barbour:  
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general covariance is physically vacuous. I believe that the physically significant issue is 
not whether or not points have a priori individuation, but the relative complexity of rival 
theories when expressed in generally covariant form. (Barbour 2001, 203) 
 
Here I think the best response for the presentist is to bite the bullet, and admit that fixed foliation 
theories of quantum gravity in their generally covariant form are more complex than standard 
theories of quantum gravity in their generally covariant form. The presentist can simply maintain 
that this particular criterion of simplicity is not a guide to truth.  
 Before moving on, it is worth pointing out that, in a later paper by Kuchar, he repeats the 
last portion of the passage from his 1992 paper, with one change: 
foliation fixing ... amounts to conceding that one can quantize gravity only by giving up 
general relativity: to say that quantum gravity makes sense only when one fixes the 
foliation is essentially the same thing as saying that quantum gravity makes sense only in 
one reference frame.  (Kuchar 1999, 182) 
 
This change from “coordinate system” to “reference frame” is crucial. Focussing on coordinate 
systems leads to the confusion about general covariance dealt with above. Focussing on 
reference frames, however, is unproblematic: the proponent of fixed foliation quantum gravity 
will agree that there is a preferred frame of reference, and can admit that there is a sense in which 
this is “essentially” the same thing as saying the theory makes sense only in one reference frame.  
  
5. Callender’s Objection.  After arguing that tensed theories like presentism are incompatible 
with special relativity (at least as traditionally formulated), Craig Callender (2000) points out that 
quantum mechanics perhaps gives some reasons to postulate a fixed foliation of spacetime, and 
mentions fixed foliation quantum gravity. He then writes: 
should the friend of tenses point to these developments in support of tenses, or at least, in 
support of brushing aside the challenge from special relativity?  
No. Developments in physics may push us away from the traditional understanding of 
relativity, but I urge the reader not to allow the tensed theory to do the same. This is not 
because I believe that only arguments based on physics ought to have a bearing on our 
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interpretations of physics. Good arguments in metaphysics often rightly have some 
influence on interpretations of physics. The problem is that I simply don’t believe that the 
arguments in metaphysics in favor of tenses are particularly good ones, though this is an 
argument for another paper.  (Callender 2000, S596-7) 
 
Callender says that we should not allow a tensed theory such as presentism to push us toward a 
non-traditional understanding of relativity, because the arguments for presentism are bad ones. 
But regardless of the strength of the arguments for presentism, the presentist is not required to 
endorse a non-traditional understanding of relativity. The presentist can simply say that 
presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, and hence special and general 
relativity are false.  
 Moreover, what Callender says in the above passage does not justify his “No” answer to 
his initial question. Here is a more precise version of his question: does the existence of fixed 
foliation quantum gravity give the presentist justification for rejecting the argument against 
presentism on the basis that presentism is incompatible with special relativity? The point of my 
paper is to argue for the “yes” answer, and nothing Callender says above casts doubt on that 
answer.  
 The passage from Callender continues, though: 
Here I can only ask, if science cannot find the ‘becoming frame’, what extra-scientific 
reason is there for positing it? If the answer is our experience of becoming, we are 
essentially stating that our brains somehow have access to a global feature of the world 
that no experiment can detect. This is rather spooky. If the answer instead comes from 
conceptual analysis on metaphysical categories such as change, we must ask whether 
there is any reason to think that our concept accurately mirrors reality. Our concept of 
(say) change is loaded with pre-scientific connotations. Why think that it reveals 
something about the properties of spacetime that science cannot?  (Callender 2000, S597) 
 
I see no reason that the presentist is committed to the antecedent of the conditional question 
Callender starts with. The presentist can admit that science has not yet found the ‘becoming 
frame’ – that is, the preferred foliation – but the presentist can simply explain that this is because 
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the preferred foliation is a part of a theory of quantum gravity, and there is currently no direct 
experimental evidence for or against the various theories of quantum gravity. As explained by 
for example Kuchar (1999, 181), the empirical predictions of a fixed foliation theory of 
canonical quantum gravity will differ depending on which foliation is selected as fixed. Thus, 
assuming that some fixed foliation theory of canonical quantum gravity is true, science can in 
principle find the becoming frame. 
 All these conclusions about the nature of theories of quantum gravity are tentative 
though; suppose that it turns out that Callender is correct to say that science cannot find the 
becoming frame. I nevertheless find the rest of his argument unconvincing. Consider first those 
presentists who believe that presentism is true on the basis of our experience of becoming. 
Callender suggests that these presentists believe that phenomenal experience gives them access 
to a feature of the world science cannot detect. But what is that feature? Such presentists need 
not claim that phenomenal experience tells them which foliation is the metaphysically privileged 
one; they can simply say that phenomenal experience demonstrates that there is becoming. 
Moreover, there is a sense in which they can maintain that all scientific experiments demonstrate 
this as well: all scientific experiments eventually culminate in a phenomenal experience, such as 
when an experimenter looks at the record of a measurement apparatus. Since all phenomenal 
experience involves an experience of becoming, then (according to this sort of presentist) all 
scientific experiments provide evidence for presentism. 
 Now consider those presentists who believe that presentism is true on the basis of 
conceptual analysis. Here I think that Callender’s argument is somewhat stronger, if only 
because arguments on the basis of conceptual analysis are generally more defeasible than 
arguments on the basis of experience. Again, though, such presentists need not claim that 
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conceptual analysis demonstrates which foliation is the metaphysically privileged one; they can 
simply say that conceptual analysis demonstrates that there is becoming. But Callender can be 
read as asking: science does not show that there is becoming, so why should we expect 
conceptual analysis to show that? The presentist can reply as follows. The issue of whether or 
not there is becoming is a philosophical issue; we should not expect science to determine that 
issue. All we should expect is that science should not turn out to be incompatible with 
presentism, and thus we should expect the correct theory of quantum gravity to be a fixed 
foliation theory.  
 At this point a question naturally arises: what should the presentist do if physicists 
eventually settle on a theory of quantum gravity which is incompatible with presentism? There is 
no simple answer to this question. Different presentists would give different answers, depending 
on the general issue of how they evaluate the relative strength of physics-based arguments as 
compared to philosophy-based arguments, and depending on specific issues such as the extent to 
which they are convinced by the philosophical arguments for presentism, and the extent to which 
they believe that the final theory of quantum gravity was arrived at by a warrant-inducing 
process.  
 
6. Gödel’s Modal Argument.  Kurt Gödel’s (1949) famous modal argument for the ideality of 
time on the basis of general relativity is implicitly an argument against presentism. There has 
been a fair amount of discussion recently about Gödel’s argument: see for example Savitt 1994, 
Earman 1995, Yourgrau 1999, and Dorato 2001. If Gödel’s argument is viewed as being about 
the nature of time in spacetimes of general relativity, then I find this recent discussion interesting 
and illuminating. In this section I will show, however, that Gödel’s argument tells us nothing 
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about the nature of time in our universe.   
 Gödel’s argument, very briefly, is as follows. Some spacetimes of general relativity, such 
as the Gödel universe, cannot be foliated into spacelike hypersurfaces. Thus, in those universes, 
there cannot be an objective lapse of time; in those universes, presentism is false. Gödel then 
writes: 
It might, however, be asked: Of what use is it if such conditions prevail in certain 
possible worlds? Does that mean anything for the question interesting us whether in our 
world there exists an objective lapse of time? (Gödel 1949, 561-2) 
 
Gödel then gives the crucial modal step of his argument: 
if someone asserts that this absolute time is lapsing [in our world], he accepts as a 
consequence that, whether or not an objective lapse of time exists ... depends on the 
particular way in which matter and its motion are arranged in the world. This is not a 
straightforward contradiction; nevertheless, a philosophical view leading to such 
consequences can hardly be considered as satisfactory. (Gödel 1949, 562) 
 
With that, his paper ends. 
 An implicit assumption of Gödel’s argument is that the Gödel universe is physically 
possible (that is, that the laws of our universe are compatible with those of the Gödel universe). 
This is made clear in various reconstructions of Gödel’s argument: Savitt (1994, 468) says that 
the Gödel universe is “physically possible”; Yourgrau (1999, 47) writes that “the actual world is 
lawlike compossible with the Gödel universe”; and Dorato (2001, 8) calls the difference between 
the Gödel universe and our universe “non-lawlike”. Moreover, as far as I can tell, these 
philosophers believe this thesis of physical possibility. Only Dorato (2001, 29) addresses the 
issue of quantum gravity, in a footnote: “until a reasonably agreed upon quantum theory of 
gravity is available, we can assume that [general relativity] is a fundamental physical theory.”  
 Pace Dorato, I maintain that, if we are trying to discover the nature of time in this 
universe, it is crucial to consider quantum gravity. Our most fundamental physics suggests that 
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our universe is one where a theory of quantum gravity is true, and general relativity is 
incompatible with all the main theories of quantum gravity; hence general relativity is in all 
likelihood false. In all likelihood, then, no spacetime of general relativity is physically possible, 
and Gödel’s assumption that the Gödel universe is physically possible is false. 
 To see that this assumption is necessary for Gödel’s argument to go through, suppose that 
a theory of fixed foliation quantum gravity is true, and that the theoretical hypotheses of the 
theory entail that (or the theory can be interpreted in such a way that) an objective lapse of time 
exists in all models of the theory. Applying Gödel’s argument, one who (correctly) says that 
absolute time is lapsing in our world 
accepts as a consequence that, whether or not an objective lapse of time exists ... depends 
on the particular way in which matter and its motion are arranged in the world.  (Gödel 
1949, 562) 
 
But this is manifestly false: according to the hypothetically true theory of fixed foliation quantum 
gravity, an objective lapse of time exists regardless of how matter and its motion are arranged in 
the world. In conclusion, Gödel’s argument is based on a false assumption about our universe, 
and thus tells us nothing about the nature of time in our universe. 
 There is one comment worth making about fixed foliation quantum gravity, inspired by 
Gödel’s modal argument. For at least some versions of fixed foliation quantum gravity, such as 
the CMC version, which foliation is fixed depends on the distribution of matter in the universe. 
Belot and Earman (2001, 247) point this out, and conclude that “the time which results in this 
case is certainly not the absolute time of Newton.” The presentist can grant this point: Newton 
wanted time to flow without relation to anything external, while there is a sense in which, in the 
CMC version of fixed foliation quantum gravity, the flow of time depends on the distribution of 
matter. But there is no need for the presentist to maintain that the foliation is the same in all 
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physically possible worlds. If there is a foliation in the spacetime model which represents our 
world, then presentism can be true in our world, and if there is a foliation in all the spacetime 
models of the theory of our world, then all versions of Gödel’s modal argument are evaded.  
  
7. The Future of Presentism.  Despite this paper’s emphasis on fixed foliation quantum gravity, 
I recognize that it is in no way a popular approach to resolving the incompatibility of quantum 
mechanics and general relativity. The two most popular approaches, M theory and loop quantum 
gravity, appear to be incompatible with presentism. Nevertheless, one must be careful: there are 
two aspects of these theories which one might think are incompatible with presentism, but which 
actually are compatible – or so I will argue. 
 First, there are suggestions from loop quantum gravity that space and time are discrete, in 
that the quantum observables measuring spatial volume and temporal intervals have discrete 
spectra (Rovelli and Upadhya 2001, Markopoulou and Smolin 1998). One might think that the 
thesis that there is a smallest interval of time is incompatible with presentism. As for example 
Saint Augustine argues, 
the only time that can be called present is an instant ... that cannot be divided even into 
the most minute fractions.... For if its duration were prolonged, it could be divided into 
past and future. (Augustine, Confessions, Book XI, section 15) 
 
My reply is that presentism need not require that the present lasts only an instant; instead 
presentism just has to require that the present cannot be divided into past and future, as St. 
Augustine specifies. If quantum gravity entails that the Planck time of about 10–42 seconds, for 
example, is the smallest interval of time, then the presentist can simply specify that that is how 
long the present lasts. It would be impossible to divide the present into past and future, since 
there would be no time intervals smaller than the Planck time.  
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 Second, there are suggestions from both theories, but especially M theory, that spacetime 
is not part of fundamental reality, but just emerges in some classical limit. (For a discussion of 
this emergence, see Butterfield and Isham 1999.) As Edward Witten puts it,  
‘spacetime’ seems destined to turn out to be only an approximate, derived notion, much 
as classical concepts such as the position and velocity of a particle are understood as 
approximate concepts in the light of quantum mechanics.  (Witten 1996, 134) 
 
Some presentists might believe that time and change have to be aspects of fundamental reality 
for presentism to be true. I maintain, though, that this is not an essential requirement of 
presentism. Presentism should not be understood as a theory about fundamental reality, it should 
be understood as a theory about time. Thus, if time is not part of fundamental reality, presentism 
is true as long as the time that emerges in the appropriate classical limit is time as described by 
presentists.  
 This leads us to the fundamental reason that M theory and loop quantum gravity are in 
fact incompatible with presentism. For M theory it is known, and for loop quantum gravity it is 
expected, that the spacetime theory that emerges in the classical limit is general relativity. (See 
for example Rovelli 1998, 5 and 8.) Thus, the time that emerges in the classical limit is not time 
as described by the presentist.  
 From the standpoint of the committed presentist, proponents of M theory and loop 
quantum gravity are simply making a mistake. Consider another analogy with quantum 
mechanics: proponents of the Bare theory – standard Schrödinger evolution with the eigenstate-
eigenvalue link – argue that the Bare theory can account for the everyday beliefs we have about 
measurement outcomes (Albert 1992, 116-119; Barrett 1994). Most people believe, though, that 
the Bare theory has a measurement problem, and hence look for ways of modifying it in order to 
save our everyday beliefs (Bub, Clifton, and Monton 1998). Presentists would say that M theory 
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and loop quantum gravity are in the same sort of situation as the Bare theory: M theory and loop 
quantum gravity are incompatible with our everyday beliefs about time. (Following Callender’s 
distinction, some presentists would say that the theories are incompatible with our experience of 
becoming, while others would say that they are incompatible with our basic concept of time.) 
Thus, just as those who endorse our everyday beliefs about measurement outcomes support the 
development of acceptable alternatives to the Bare theory, so those who endorse presentist 
beliefs about time should support the development of acceptable alternatives to M theory and 
loop quantum gravity.  
 Given that physics is currently moving in the direction of M theory and loop quantum 
gravity, presentism’s future prospects do not look good, at least from the standpoint of the 
argument considered in the Introduction. Nevertheless, based on the existence of potentially 
viable theories of fixed foliation quantum gravity, I conclude that presentism is compatible with 
our most fundamental physics – for now.  
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